In an era defined by digital transformation, the aviation sector has evolved into a sophisticated, data-driven ecosystem. It is not only vital for global commerce and mobility but also recognized by the Department of Homeland Security as critical infrastructure. From air traffic control systems and aircraft engines to ticketing platforms and ground operations, the aviation ecosystem is powered by complex, interconnected software systems. 

But as these systems become more advanced, they also become more exposed. 

At the heart of this exposure lies a stark truth: a single software vulnerability can compromise the safety, reliability, and resilience of the entire aviation ecosystem.

We last saw this interplay and dependence on software with the Boeing 737 Max air crashes in 2018 and 2019. In those crashes, the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS, failed primarily due to a flawed software design.

These disasters serve as a cautionary tale of how integrating software into critical control systems requires a holistic validation of system safety protocols. 

More recently, Mary Schiavo, who served as the United States Department of Transportation Inspector General and is now an aviation attorney, raised concerns that a software glitch may have contributed to the crash of Air India Flight AI-171.

Specifically, she suggested a software glitch affecting the Full Authority Digital Engine Control or FADEC, may have caused a dual-engine shutdown leading to the crash. 

What is a FADEC?

A FADEC is a fully digital, embedded control system that manages all aspects of aircraft engine performance. From engine startup and throttle control to fuel injection and over-temperature protection, FADECs are essential to engine performance.

Controlled by embedded software and real-time data, FADEC replaces manual pilot inputs with algorithmic decision-making. When operating as intended, FADEC ensures precision, efficiency, and safety. 

FADECs interface with the aircraft’s avionics and flight computers, and in some cases, can be updated or diagnosed remotely or during ground maintenance through connected systems. Engine maintenance crews and support equipment play a critical role in the cybersecurity posture of FADEC systems. While FADECs are tightly integrated and generally hardened for flight operations, their exposure increases significantly during ground maintenance, where human interaction and digital interfaces open pathways for cyber compromise (intentionally or unintentionally). 

Because it is networked and software-driven, FADECs are a potential target for malware.

The risks are not theoretical. In other industries, like automotive or industrial control, cyber attacks have already demonstrated how digital manipulation of control systems can result in physical harm. In aviation, a compromised FADEC could escalate from a performance anomaly to a critical component failure in a matter of minutes, particularly if it occurs during critical flight phases like takeoff or landing. 

The following methods can lead to poor cyber hygiene, potentially compromising FADEC. 

Use of Unsecured Diagnostic and Programming Tools 

• FADEC units are often accessed using laptops, tablets, or portable data loaders to perform updates, diagnostics, or software uploads.

• If these devices are not regularly patched, encrypted, or monitored, they can act as infection vectors, introducing malware into FADEC systems via USB, Ethernet, or wireless connections. 

Weak Access Controls and Credentials 

• Maintenance personnel may use shared passwords or fail to log individual access events.

• Lack of multi-factor authentication or role-based access controls increases the risk of unauthorized FADEC configuration or tampering.

Improper Update Protocols 

• When maintenance crews install software updates or patches to the FADEC, the integrity and authenticity of those files must be verified (e.g., with cryptographic signatures).

• If verification steps are skipped, it becomes possible to inject modified firmware or alter engine control logic without detection.

Supply Chain and Contractor Risks 

• Third-party maintenance teams, particularly those working under contract or in foreign jurisdictions, may not follow uniform cybersecurity standards.

• Support equipment sourced from multiple vendors may lack consistent hardening or security certifications, creating backdoors during maintenance procedures.

Lack of Cybersecurity Training 

• Many technicians are trained for mechanical and electrical safety, but not for cyber hygiene.

• Unintentional behaviors like connecting a personal USB stick to a diagnostic port can bypass security protocols and introduce malware into engine systems.

Networked Maintenance Bays 

• Increasingly, maintenance hangars and flight line support systems are connected to enterprise or cloud-based systems for real-time diagnostics and reporting.

• If these networks are not properly segmented, a vulnerability in the IT network can propagate to flight-critical systems like the FADEC.

The Wrap 

The aviation industry’s reliance on FADECs exemplifies the broader reality that software is becoming indispensable for modern air travel. The societal question that must be asked is what type of parameters and controls are needed to ensure the safety of software-enabled flight systems.

For IT and security professionals, the idea of a hacker remotely triggering a critical flight-system failure has to be taken seriously.

The precedent is there, as cyber intrusions in cars, power grids, and hospital systems have already shown how code can cause real-world harm. While there is no official ruling on the cause of the recent Air India crash, it nevertheless serves as a reminder to treat aviation as the critical infrastructure it is.

Cybersecurity must be elevated to the same level of importance as airworthiness.

Industry stakeholders, regulatory agencies, and technology suppliers must collaborate to foster continued trust among the flying public.